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FAR FROM THE MADDING CROWD: CROWDFUNDING A 
SMALL BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 
ABSTRACT 
Crowdfunding, the act of raising small sums of money from a large pool of 
people over the internet, represents a new way for small businesses to raise 
capital. Thousands of entrepreneurs have used online portals such as 
Indiegogo.com or Kickstarter.com to fund their business ventures. While the 
results of those campaigns vary wildly, the market itself has thrived, and 
currently sees an annual investment of $90 billion. As more businesses turn to 
crowdfunding, the likelihood that crowdfunding will come into conflict with the 
Bankruptcy Code increases.  
This Comment proposes a framework by which bankruptcy courts can 
analyze cases involving non-equity crowdfunding and small business debtors. 
The framework is best described in the context of four questions likely to be 
raised by the creditors of a crowdfunding debtor. First, creditors may seek to 
cancel a crowdfunding campaign once the debtor has filed for bankruptcy. 
Section 365, and the concept of contingent interests, will both allow the debtor 
to overcome these objections and incentivize debtors to withhold them in the first 
place. Second, creditors may object to the use of estate property in the campaign 
itself. Section 363 provides courts with a means to evaluate these objections and 
debtors with a means to defeat them. Third, creditors may seek to prevent a 
debtor from taking on new debt by fulfilling its post-petition crowdfunding 
obligations. Section 364, however, suggests that those obligations should be 
considered administrative expenses. Finally, creditors may oppose confirmation 
of a reorganization plan predicated on a successful crowdfunding campaign. If 
such a plan is carefully designed, however, it can satisfy § 1129(a)(11)’s 
feasibility standard. 
Bankruptcy Courts can and should evaluate these cases with an eye towards 
promoting trust in the crowdfunding sector. By explaining the proposed 
framework through the eyes of a fictional small business, this Comment argues 
that courts can answer creditors’ questions in a way that both satisfies the twin 
aims of bankruptcy and protects the integrity of the crowdfunding system.  
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PREFACE 
Debt, as a general rule, is undesirable. Nevertheless, as the economy 
continues to grow in unexpected directions, debt remains a constant part of 
almost any market.1 Small businesses treading water in that oft-raging sea of 
equity often discover that, as Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote in 1860, “money 
often costs too much.”2 Failure to raise capital, then, becomes the breaker upon 
which so many entrepreneurs ultimately crash.  
Crowdfunding represents one means by which individuals and businesses 
can avoid the pitfalls of debt-based capital formation.3 Crowdfunding is, in its 
simplest form, “a financing model that relies on collecting small sums of money 
from many people over the Internet.”4 The process is straightforward. Instead of 
giving up equity to a bank or encumbering more of their property with liens, 
entrepreneurs can tap into their consumer base for needed capital. Using online 
portals such as Kickstarter.com or Indiegogo.com, the entrepreneur, and 
thousands like her, simply lists her project online for the masses to evaluate. If 
an individual likes the project, and wishes to see it thrive, he can contribute funds 
and become a “backer.” In addition to knowing that they have contributed to 
something they are passionate about, backers are often rewarded with special 
access, recognition, or items to commemorate their benevolence. 
These contributions are flowing in at unexpected rates. According to Forbes, 
the crowdfunding sector will see investment of $90 billion per year by 2017, and 
has likely already overcome venture capital in terms of average yearly 
investment.5 Small businesses are playing their part in this surge because 
“[c]rowdfunding addresses a well-known gap in financing for companies and 
projects with prospects too uncertain to qualify for bank loans as well as business 
plans too small or esoteric to attract angel investors or venture capital funding.”6 
 
 1 At least one commentator has gone further to argue that our “debt-based economy” predates even the 
original 13 colonies. K-Sue Park, Money, Mortgages, and the Conquest of America, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
1006, 1014 (2016). 
 2 See Rob Berger, Top 100 Money Quotes of All Time, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/robertberger/2014/04/30/top-100-money-quotes-of-all-time/#534e652675e7. 
 3 Throughout this Comment, the term “debt-based capital formation” is used as shorthand for traditional 
methods of capital formation, including loans, mortgages and venture capital. The “pitfalls” referred to here are 
those that usually come with attaching new obligations to a business: lost equity, interest, and opportunity cost 
being the most recognizable. 
 4 Amy Cortese, Pennies from Many, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 25, 2011. 
 5 Chance Barnett, Trends Show Crowdfunding to Surpass VC in 2016, FORBES (May 9, 2015), 
http://onforb.es/1GbtdwP. 
 6 See generally Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Se(c)(3): A Catalyst for Social Enterprise 
Crowdfunding, 90 IND. L.J. 1091, 1101 (2015). 
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On Indiegogo, the “small business” category is filled with well over 250 
campaigns7 crowdfunding for everything from opening a hot yoga studio in 
Richmond, Virginia ($5,750 raised)8 to relocating a modular “co-living space” 
in Los Angeles ($29,307 raised).9 The allure of tapping into the crowd for capital 
has also been felt in larger corporate circles. In 2015, Sony, an international 
company with $148 billion in assets, announced that the third installment of its 
long dormant video game series Shenmue would be funded via Kickstarter.10 
Despite some intense media skepticism and criticism, Sony raised $800,000 in 
the first half hour of the campaign.11 
Unfortunately, small businesses often have a rough go in today’s economy—
in 2016, for example, an average filing-day saw 151 businesses file for 
bankruptcy.12 As the amount of businesses using crowdfunding platforms grows, 
so too will the amount of crowdfunding businesses that fail. More failed 
businesses funded by crowdfunding campaigns will logically lead to more 
businesses filing for bankruptcy that still owe promises to backers. These 
failures will ultimately bring crowdfunding into conflict with chapter 11 of the 
Code.13 
INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholarship has only recently addressed crowdfunding from a 
bankruptcy perspective. In a 2013 American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) Journal 
feature titled “Crowdfunding” a Chapter 11 Plan, one commentator wrote that 
while “[c]rowdfunding has the potential to create new options for small business 
debtors . . . if and when these new options arise in the context of bankruptcy 
cases, they will inevitably raise a host of questions.”14 This Comment will 
address four of those questions, each likely to be brought by creditors of a small 
business debtor. It will not suggest how a court should rule in any particular 
 
 7 INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/explore/smallbusiness#/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 8 Humble Haven Yoga, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/humble-haven-yoga-
community-health/x/15370259#/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 9 Save Podshare, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/save-podshare-end-world-
loneliness/x/15370259#/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 10 See Dalton Cooper, E3 2015: ‘Shenmue 3’ Announced, To Be Funded on Kickstarter, GAMERANT 
https://gamerant.com/shenmue-3-kickstarter-e3-2015/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). 
 11 Cf. The Know, Shenmue 3 a Scam?! You decide, YOUTUBE (June 22, 2015), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=vl4NzY9umlU. 
 12 37,823 businesses filed for bankruptcy in 2016; 6,591 of those filings at least started in Chapter 11. 
January 2017 Bankruptcy Statistics- Commercial Filings, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (Feb. 2, 2017), 
http://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics. 
 13 As of the time of writing, no bankruptcy court opinions concerning crowdfunding have been published. 
 14 David McGrail, Crowdfunding A Chapter 11 Plan, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 30–31 (2013). 
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case; as will be discussed, such inquiries are rather fact intensive. The Comment 
will, however, propose a framework for how a court can decide (1) whether the 
campaign should be cancelled outright upon filing, (2) whether a debtor can use 
property of the estate to crowdfund, (3) whether promised rewards can be paid 
without upsetting eventual distribution, and (4) whether a chapter 11 plan can 
be confirmed if it relies on crowdfunding as a means of capital formation.  
This Comment will suggest that, with regards to crowdfunding, the Code 
need not be reinvented, and the tools to analyze these four questions are already 
present in the judge’s toolbox. The threshold question of the crowdfunding 
campaign’s continuation is addressed by § 365, which concerns executory 
contracts, and § 541’s allowance of contingent interests as property of the estate. 
As discussed infra in parts III (B) and (C), these two sections should allow 
debtors to continue their campaigns after filing for chapter 11. Part III (D) 
discusses how § 363 will authorize debtors-in-possession to use property of the 
estate to crowdfund.15 Part III (E) proposes that, because rewards promised to 
backers are post-petition burdens, § 364 can allow debtors to satisfy those 
obligations. Finally, part III (F) suggests that crowdfunding can satisfy 
§ 1129(a)(11)’s feasibility requirement, and that reliance on such a campaign 
need not be fatal to a plan’s confirmation. That such a framework is already 
present in the Code means that courts do not need to react impulsively in 
response to crowdfunding 16  
Broadly speaking, there are two types of crowdfunding: equity 
crowdfunding and non-equity crowdfunding. While this Comment concerns the 
former, the latter will be discussed by way of comparison, especially in part II 
(A), with regards to the 2012 “Jumpstart Our Business Startups” (“JOBS”) 
Act.17 Equity crowdfunding platforms are akin to virtual stock exchanges. Both 
individual and institutional investors can log in to an equity crowdfunding portal, 
such as Microventures.com or Equitynet.com, and purchase shares in 
 
 15 As discussed in Part III(C), “use” is a term of art in the context of § 363. 
 16 Outside of bankruptcy, crowdfunding fits in a niche between securities and contracts. See Reza Dibaji, 
Crowdfunding Delusions, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 15, 16 (2016) (arguing that “existing crowdfunding sites 
carefully manage around a fundamental ambiguity in the securities laws—a surprisingly fuzzy definition of what 
a ‘security’ is”). 
 17 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012). Some commentators argue that “equity crowdfunding” is a misnomer 
for the marketplace that the JOBS Act helped to create. Cf. Ryan Caldbeck, Equity Crowdfunding is Dead, TECH 
CRUNCH (May 16, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/16/equity-crowdfunding-is-dead/ (“This isn’t 
“crowdfunding” because there needn’t be any “crowd”—the marketplace is a conduit for the right investors and 
entrepreneurs to come together.”). For the purposes of this Comment, the term will suffice. 
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companies.18 Backers on these platforms become shareholders, and because they 
represent a wide swath of the investing community, companies seeking their 
investment can cater to a wider set of interests than they would in a traditional 
investment setting.19 In bankruptcy, these backers would fall behind secured and 
unsecured creditors in chapter 11 proceedings.20  
This Comment focuses on non-equity-based crowdfunding, which 
represents a more attractive proposition to many entrepreneurs because, as the 
name would suggest, it does not require a business owner to give up equity or 
shares.21 As described in Part II (B), a business using a non-equity crowdfund 
can theoretically raise capital by trading on nothing more than the goodwill of 
its customers. Further, non-equity campaigns on platforms that do not allow 
securities offerings, such as Kickstarter.com22 or GoFundMe.com,23 are 
governed by general contract law, which is more accessible to small business 
owners than securities law.24 As non-equity crowdfunding contracts are 
governed by contract law, they are simpler to evaluate in bankruptcy. For 
example, in a non-equity crowdfunding case, § 1145’s securities law exemptions 
need not be considered.25 
When a business involved in crowdfunding files for bankruptcy, three 
unique qualities of crowdfunding schemes may pose challenges for bankruptcy 
courts.26 First, many platforms use an “all or nothing” system wherein funds are 
not released to project organizers until their “goals,” as filed with the platform 
 
 18 If it deals in equity, a crowdfunding intermediary must register with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as a broker or as a funding portal and become a member of a national securities association 
(FINRA). See FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about/funding-portals-we-regulate (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 19 Caldbeck, supra note 17.  
 20 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, What Every Investor Should Know: Corporate 
Bankruptcy (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/bankrupt.htm. 
 21 For a discussion of the limits of equity crowdfunding, see Deborah L. Jacobs, The Trouble with 
Crowdfunding, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/04/17/the-trouble-
with-crowdfunding/#40f823225f45) (“The risks, burdens and limitations of [equity] crowdfunding render it 
almost completely useless.”). 
 22 See Rules, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/rules (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (“Projects 
can’t offer financial incentives like equity or repayment.”). 
 23 GoFundMe only allows pure donations. See Common Questions, GO FUND ME, https://www. 
gofundme.com/questions (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 24 See 2 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 14.01 (2016) (“Similarly, the rules of conduct on social 
networks, online games, blogs and other websites generally are determined by contract.”). 
 25 11 U.S.C. § 1145 (2012). 
 26 For simplicity, this Comment will generally use the term “crowdfunding” to refer to non-equity 
crowdfunding. Similarly, a crowdfunding campaign can be referred to as a “crowdfund,” and monies received 
through said campaign are “crowdfunds.”  
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and advertised to prospective backers, have been met.27 If the goals are not met, 
the campaign receives nothing. One could imagine a scenario where a debtor has 
raised 90% of its goal on the date of filing for chapter 11. Should the court force 
the campaign’s cessation to appease risk averse creditors? Or should the court 
allow it to continue in the hopes that a successful crowdfunding campaign can 
provide the debtor with funds for either its day one obligations or plan crucial 
operating capital? In part III (B) and (C), this Comment will answer these 
questions by focusing on two concepts. First, § 365 (executory contracts) 
provides a basis upon which a court can allow a crowdfunding campaign to 
continue without input or objection from creditors. Second, § 541’s inclusion of 
“contingent interests” in property of the estate creates an incentive for creditors 
to withhold objections in the first place. 
The second challenge derives from how most platforms focus on “rewards 
based” campaigns, wherein project organizers offer incentives to backers, such 
as special access to the design process or early access to the backed item.28 
Should a company engaging in such a campaign file for chapter 11, it is 
conceivable that its creditors will do anything in their power to prevent those 
rewards from being both issued by the debtor and given to the backers, especially 
if doing so would shrink the size of the estate. As articulated in parts III (D) and 
(E), existing law, specifically §§ 363 and 364 of the Code, can provide courts 
with a framework with which to evaluate the debtor’s plans.  
The third challenge, as discussed in parts II(C) and III (E), is that predicting 
the outcome of a crowdfunding campaign is difficult. Part III (E) addresses the 
final stage of many chapter 11 analyses: confirmation. Part III (E) will suggest 
that basing a reorganization on a successful crowdfunding campaign can satisfy 
§ 1129(a)(11)’s feasibility standard. 
Finally, this Comment will argue that bankruptcy courts can promote the 
twin aims of bankruptcy—the fresh start and fair and equitable distribution—
with an eye towards protecting backer confidence in the crowdfunding system 
as a whole. By doing so, courts may enable all three types of interested parties 
to reap some benefit from the chapter 11 proceedings. If all goes well, backers 
may receive their “rewards,” and, ideally, the knowledge that their contribution 
has gone towards helping their chosen cause. Debtor companies that are allowed 
 
 27 See Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter+basics? 
ref=footer (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (“Funding on Kickstarter is all-or-nothing. No one will be charged for a 
pledge towards a project unless it reaches its funding goal. This way, creators always have the budget they 
scoped out before moving forward.”). 
 28 See id. 
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to continue crowdfunding during their bankruptcy case will be more likely to 
make the capital improvements necessary to keep the doors open, keep up with 
plan payments, and keep employees paid. Accordingly, creditors, though 
prevented from raiding the crowdfund for short term gains, will be more likely 
to see long-term returns as the reorganized business uses those new capital 
improvements to successfully complete its chapter 11 plan. If such a result is 
realized, both the bankruptcy system and the crowdfunding system, as analyzed 
in part III (A), will benefit. 
Like Thomas Hardy’s 1874 Novel Far from the Madding Crowd, this 
Comment draws its name from Thomas Gray’s poem Elegy Written in a Country 
Churchyard. Like the poem’s narrator, this Comment seeks to avoid “the 
madding crowd’s ignoble strife.”29 If judges can analyze crowdfunding without 
engaging in such ignoble strife, they can empower crowdfunding debtor 
businesses to fully utilize the power of the crowd. The “madding crowd” need 
not be feared—and can, indeed, be tamed. 
I. BACKGROUND AND LEGAL DOCTRINES 
A. The JOBS Act Suggests that Congress Has Liberalized Capital Formation 
Any analytical framework used by bankruptcy courts must fit within the 
judiciary’s role of interpreting the laws as written by the legislature.”30 Those 
laws, as Karl Llewellyn observed, “must be read in the light of some assumed 
purpose.”31 This task is simpler when the courts have a statute in which to search 
for a purpose. Currently, there is no federal statute or regulation pertaining to 
non-equity crowdfunding.32 However, in terms of both design and intent, the 
 
 29 Thomas Gray, Elegy Written in a Country Courtyard, THOMAS GRAY ARCHIVE, http://www. 
thomasgray.org/cgi-bin/display.cgi?text=elcc (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 30 As Bankruptcy Judge Hon. Thomas F. Waldron wrote for the ABI, “[i]t is essential to recall that 
contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes that the purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine Congressional intent.” Thomas F. Waldron, BAPCPA in the Courts: How Judicial Interpretation of 
the New Provisions Affects Your Cases, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 19TH ANNUAL WINTER 
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, 071206 ABI-CLE 15 (noting that this task has been difficult in recent years in the 
bankruptcy sphere; writing, for example, “the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act [] 
has been repeatedly recognized by the bankruptcy community as, what in common parlance would be called, a 
mess.”)  
 31 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about how 
Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1949). 
 32 As Llewellyn also wrote, “[s]tatutes in pari materia must be construed together.” Because we only 
have one statute at issue here (i.e., the JOBS Act, which only concerns equity crowdfunding), this canon is only 
helpful in the abstract. That is, because we only have one statute, we have nothing to “construe together.” Id. at 
402.  
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2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the JOBS Act), while not specifically 
relevant to non-equity-based crowdfunding, signals congressional support for a 
liberalization of how small businesses raise capital. If the goal of the JOBS Act 
was to create avenues for capital formation, then, it is reasonable to infer that 
Congress’ “assumed purpose” was to create similar avenues for existing small 
businesses.33 
The passage of the JOBS and CROWDFUND34 Acts signaled that, by 2012, 
Washington, D.C. had seen the great power of crowdfunding as a capital 
formation tool.35 In passing these Acts, Congress signaled that, in the midst of 
the “Great Recession,” the federal government was ready to democratize 
investment on a large scale.36 As early as 2011, the Obama Administration 
signaled its support of a bill that would “make it easier for entrepreneurs to raise 
capital and create jobs.”37 In his 2012 State of the Union Address, President 
Obama pushed Congress to open up investment opportunities for small 
businesses, saying that “Most new jobs are created in start-ups and small 
businesses. So let’s pass an agenda that helps them succeed. Tear down 
regulations that prevent aspiring entrepreneurs from getting the financing to 
grow.”38 His remarks at the Act’s signing four months later are further 
illustrative:  
And for start-ups and small businesses, this bill is a potential game 
changer. Right now, you can only turn to a limited group of 
investors—including banks and wealthy individuals—to get funding. 
Laws that are nearly eight decades old make it impossible for others to 
invest. But a lot has changed in 80 years, and it’s time our laws did as 
 
 33 See JOBS Act Eases Regulatory Burdens on Capital Raising, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Apr. 2012), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/jobs-act-eases-regulatory-burdens-capital-raising (“Primarily, the 
purpose of the JOBS Act is to help ease the regulatory burden of capital raising for startups and smaller 
companies leading to increased economic growth and job creation.”). 
 34 The “Capital RaisingOnline While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2011” was a 
companion bill to the JOBS Act that amended parts of the Securities Act of 1933 to “provide for registration 
exemptions for certain crowdfunded securities. S. 2190, 112th Congress (2012). 
 35 See also PandoDaily, Naval Ravikant: How I Changed the Jobs Act, YouTube (Nov. 15, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ugDyaVLPj3w. Ravikant, co-founder of AngelList, an angel investing 
platform, discussed in this interview how involved the crowdfunding industry was in lobbying for Securities 
reform (“I spent six months of my life just calling in favors left and right.”).  
 36 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, “Statement of Administration 
Policy-H.R. 2930” (Nov. 2, 2011) (“[the President] called for cutting away the red tape that prevents many 
rapidly growing startup companies from raising needed capital, including through a “crowdfunding” exemption. 
which would enable greater flexibility in soliciting relatively small equity investments.”). 
 37 Id.  
 38 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-
address. 
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well. Because of this bill, start-ups and small business will now have 
access to a big, new pool of potential investors—namely, the American 
people. For the first time, ordinary Americans will be able to go online 
and invest in entrepreneurs that they believe in. 39 
The legislative history behind the Act follows a similar trajectory.40 Then-
Representative Spencer Bachus, for example, stated on the House floor that 
“[Congress] must cut the red tape that prevents our small businesses and 
entrepreneurs [from capital formation] . . . . They are creating the most jobs. This 
legislation will give them the freedom to access capital, to hire workers, and to 
grow jobs.”41 
The intent to liberalize the means by which small businesses can raise capital 
was also bipartisan. In the Senate, 23 Democrats joined the entire Republican 
minority to pass the bill 73-26.42 In the House, the entire Republican majority 
and 145 Democrats pushed the bill to President Obama’s desk, where it was 
quickly signed.43 The expediency by which the bill passed both the House and 
the Senate, with obvious support from the executive branch, suggests that 
Washington recognized the reality that “outdated laws [were] cutting off a huge 
pool of potential capital for small, private businesses that have been all but 
abandoned by banks and Wall Street.”44  
To be clear, the Act does not strictly apply to non-equity crowdfunding. 
Among other things, it allows investors earning less than $200,000 a year with 
a net worth below $1 million to invest in startups through certain online 
platforms.45 Those platforms are also subject to restrictions, such as a limit of $1 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 The groundwork for President Obama’s push was arguably laid by Republican Representatives Carney 
and Fincher, who introduced H.R. 3606, the Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth 
Companies Act, in 2011. H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2012). That act was largely incorporated into the JOBS Act. 
 41 158 Cong. Rec. H1234-01 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. Bachus). For differing views on 
the SEC’s role in regulating this marketplace, compare R. Kevin Saunders II, Power to the People: How the 
SEC Can Empower the Crowd, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 945, 945 (2014) (proposing that the SEC “initially 
adopt a light regulatory approach, let the market regulate itself where practicable, and impose harsher regulation 
only where necessary”) with Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the 
Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 
N.C.L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2012) (concluding that “the only appropriate exemption for crowdfunding is one 
conditioned on meaningful disclosures about the company and the terms of the offering.”). 
 42 CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3606/actions (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2018) 
 43 Final Vote Results For Roll Call 132, OFFICE OF THE CLERK (Mar. 27, 2012), http://clerk.house.gov/ 
evs/2012/roll132.xml. 
 44 Cortese, supra note 4. 
 45 Lucinda Shen, Now Anybody Can Try Being a Venture Capitalist, FORTUNE (May 16, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/16/title-iii-jobs-act/. 
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million on investment during any twelve-month period.46 For our purposes, then, 
the JOBS Act should be evaluated considering intent rather than substance. 
Given that Congress has shown a preference for making equity-based 
crowdfunding easier, it is likely that Congress will eventually show a similar 
preference for non-equity-based crowdfunding as well. Non-equity-based 
crowdfunding carries less risks than its equity-based cousin.47 More importantly, 
non-equity crowdfunding is considerably simpler than equity crowdfunding; 
while the former is essentially a one-time transaction (i.e., money is exchanged 
for rewards), the latter creates a continuous relationship governed by securities 
law.48 If Congress was willing to liberalize equity-based crowdfunding for the 
masses, then, it is logical that Congress would be equally willing to open up 
avenues for non-equity-based campaigns for smaller businesses. Bankruptcy 
courts can, and indeed should, keep this in mind when hearing cases dealing with 
crowdfunding campaigns.  
B. Crowdfunding through the Eyes of a Small Business 
Theory can only take one so far before practicality demands some attention. 
Before explaining the framework that courts can use to evaluate crowdfunding 
small businesses, it would be helpful to explain who those small businesses are 
likely to be. For reasons described in this section, small, local, and respected 
businesses, such as family restaurants, are most likely to crowdfund 
successfully. In the interest of simplicity, this Comment will explain its proposed 
analytical framework through the eyes of a fictitious small business, owned 
wholly by Mr. Al Jones, called Al’s Pizza.49 This section serves two purposes: 
to introduce the reader to the type of business likely to use crowdfunding, and 
to explain why those businesses can successfully do so.  
 
 46 Id. 
 47 Risks that apply to equity crowdfunding and not non-equity crowdfunding include adverse or 
overinflated valuations, added compliance and corporate governance costs, and a low initial rate of success; 
during the early stages of equity crowdfunding in the UK, “one in five companies that raised money on equity 
crowdfunding platforms between 2011 and 2013 had gone bankrupt.” Mary Childs, Fears That Crowdfunding 
Poses Risks for Small Investors, FIN. TIMES (June 1, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e7756dae-2740-11e6-
8ba3-cdd781d02d89. 
 48 See generally Lisa T. Alexander, Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 
309, 350 (arguing that the JOBS Act, and equity crowdfunding generally, does not do enough to increase 
“historically marginalized actors’ access to new crowdfunding markets.”) 
 49 A pizza restaurant was chosen because few things are more ubiquitous than the local pizza joint. 
Between 2007 and 2010, “[a]bout 1 in 8 Americans consumed pizza on any given day.” Donna G. Rhodes et al., 
Consumption of Pizza: What We Eat in America, NHANES 2007-2010, USDA FOOD SURVEYS RESEARCH 
GROUP DIETARY DATA BRIEF NO. 11 (Feb. 2014), https://www.ars.usda.gov/ARSUserFiles/80400530/pdf/ 
DBrief/11_consumption_of_pizza_0710.pdf. Al’s Pizza is fictitious, and no identification with actual restaurants 
or persons is intended or should be inferred. 
TAMBURRO_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 5/30/2018 1:24 PM 
2018] CROWDFUNDING A SMALL BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 531 
In § 101, the Code defines, in relevant part, a “small business debtor” as “a 
person engaged in commercial or business activities . . . that has aggregate 
noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debts as of the date of the filing 
of the petition or the date of the order for relief in an amount not more than 
$2,566,050.”50 For this Comment, this definition is rather over-inclusive, and it 
fails to give an accurate picture of the types of businesses likely to rely on 
crowdfunding.51 Likewise, the United States Small Business Administration 
lists 813 “sub-sections” of small business types.52 This Comment’s proposed 
framework would apply to any small business so classified. However, 
manufacturing and service companies that generally do not interact with the 
public are less likely to utilize crowdfunding.53 A manufacturer of sporting 
goods, for example, will not have the same “community” of loyal retail 
customers as the family-owned store selling those products.54 Put differently, 
more traditional “mom and pop” stores, such as restaurants and dry cleaners, are 
much more likely to have some social capital to tap into with a crowdfunding 
campaign.55  
Social capital is the key to crowdfunding, and small businesses are in a 
unique position to exploit that capital. With regards to small businesses, studies 
have described the importance of social capital, “including social capital from 
family and friends and including social capital mediated by social networks.”56 
Small businesses can create social capital in several ways: by becoming involved 
in local events, offering personal contacts with customers, and returning profit 
back into their communities. These businesses are therefore uniquely poised to 
 
 50 11 U.S.C. § 101(51)(D)(A) (2012). 
 51 Though, as discussed supra with regards to Sony, crowdfunding is certainly not limited to small 
businesses. Supra Part I. 
 52 13 C.F.R. § 121.201 (2012). 
 53 See Massimo G. Columbo, Chiara Franzoni & Cristina Rossi-Lamastra, Internal Social Capital and 
the Attraction of Early Contributions in Crowdfunding, 39 ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY AND PRAC. 75, 75 
(2014) (internal citations omitted). 
 54 See generally Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, The Role of Social Capital in Financial 
Development, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 526 (2004). 
 55 See Mark Casson & Marina Della Giusta, Entrepreneurship and Social Capital: Analysing the Impact 
of Social Networks on Entrepreneurial Activity from a Rational Action Perspective, 25 INT’L SMALL BUS. J. 220, 
220 (Jun. 2007) (“The concept of social capital is widely agreed to be ambiguous. It has many different 
connotations, and so the scope for confusion is considerable.”). For the purposes of this Comment, social capital 
can be seen in the broad sense as “the connections and shared values that exist between people and enable 
cooperation. Chris Cancialosi, 4 Reasons Social Capital Trumps All, FORBES (Sep. 22, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chriscancialosi/2014/09/22/4-reasons-social-capital-trumps-all/#22b7f63c6986. 
An older conception, that social capital “includes[s] information, ideas, leads, business opportunities, financial 
capital, power, emotional support, goodwill, trust, and cooperation” may also be illustrative. WAYNE BAKER, 
ACHIEVING SUCCESS THROUGH SOCIAL CAPITAL 25 (2000).  
 56 See supra, note 53, at 95 (internal citations omitted). 
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take advantage of their social networks for financial gain. According to Pew 
Research, “87% of crowdfunding donors feel that [crowdfunding] platforms 
help contributors feel more connected to the products they support.”57  
Applying the concept to our example business, Al’s Pizza can capitalize on 
this trend by offering backers rewards that “connect” them to its products, such 
as special access or branded merchandise. Further, projects designed to “help a 
person in need” are the most popular type of crowdfunding campaigns, making 
up 68% of the market. Of those contributions, 63% go to “a friend-of-a-friend 
or acquaintance.”58 If Jones has created a social network to the extent that 
customers see him as at least an acquaintance, his business has an opportunity 
to exploit that network. This is good for Jones, as his business is heading towards 
insolvency. Al’s business debts, including a bank lien on his pizza oven,59 
unpaid rent, debt owed to suppliers,60 withheld salary for two full-time 
employees, and an adverse judgment in a slip and fall case, equal $500,000.  
C. Introduction to Crowdfunding Campaigns  
This section describes both the crowdfunding landscape and the type of 
campaign that Al’s Pizza will embark upon. Prior to the passage of the JOBS 
Act in 2012, small businesses had less capital formation options than did larger 
corporations.61 Even after the act passed, the U.S. Small Business 
Administration wrote in July 2016 that “[s]mall businesses’ financing options 
typically fall into two categories: debt and equity.”62 Debt-based financing is an 
integral part of the small business landscape; 63% of all small employer 
businesses have some debt,63 and, in 2012, “credit cards were one of the top 
three sources of short term capital used by small businesses.”64 Jones, 
understanding that any loan terms he could get would be unfavorable,65 and 
 
 57 Aaron Smith, Shared, Collaborative and On Demand: The New Digital Economy, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (May 19, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/05/19/the-new-digital-economy/.  
 58 Id. 
 59 Some time after this Comment was written, a bankruptcy judge in Atlanta suggested to the author that, 
for various reasons, most trustees would abandon an industrial pizza oven. For the sake of this hypothetical, Al’s 
oven can be liquidated if necessary.  
 60 Some of this debt will come post-petition. 
 61 Cortese, supra note 4. 
 62 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFF. OF ADVOC., Small Business Finance: Frequently Asked Questions (July 
2016), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Finance-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 This analysis assumes that the costs of crowdfunding, such as time, risk of failure, and payment of 
rewards, will be less than the costs of taking on a new, traditional loan, which can be substantial. “Microloans,” 
for example, are provided in part by the Small Business Administration for businesses much like Al’s. Their 
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unwilling to add any more liens to his property, has another option in the form 
of a crowdfunding campaign. Hoping to avoid bankruptcy, and chapter 7 in 
particular, Jones decides to create such a campaign on the crowdfunding portal 
Indiegogo.com.66  
Next assume that confirmation of Jones’ reorganization plan hinges on badly 
needed improvements to the restaurant, and that the crowdfunding campaign is 
the only reasonable means of paying for those improvements. The plan adds new 
seating and rearranges the dining room to accommodate ten more seats at the 
cost of $10,000. He could also buy an additional pizza oven, thus doubling 
productivity, and reducing wait times during the lunch rush, for $15,000. Jones 
reasons that these two main additions, coupled with various smaller 
improvements to the restaurant, would provide him with an additional $100,000 
in revenue per year.67 This increased revenue would allow Jones room to pay off 
his debts over the course of perhaps six or seven years, or, should he need to file 
for bankruptcy, give him more of a chance to stay out of chapter 7. With all of 
this in mind, Jones sets his campaign goal at $25,000.68  
Like nearly every other campaign creator on Indiegogo, Al’s will need to 
offer incentives to potential backers. These incentives, known in the 
crowdfunding arena as “perks” or “rewards,” can entail tangible gifts, such as 
clothing, future discounts, public recognition, and special access. Rewards-
based crowdfunding does not work if the “rewards” are not significantly 
inexpensive compared to the prices paid for them. Or, said another way, for a 
campaign to be successful, a project organizer must make considerably more 
profit from a crowdfunding transaction than they would from a traditional “sale.” 
Backers know this going in to the transaction, and yet continue that transaction 
for altruistic reasons. As one commentator wrote in 2011, “beyond a few tokens 
 
interest rates will generally fall between 8 and 13%. Katie Murray, Financing Your Small Business With a 
Microloan, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.sba.gov/blogs/financing-your-small-
business-microloan. Further, online small business loans from sites such as Kabbage.com can carry an average 
annual percentage rate of 40%. See Darren Dahl, The Six-Minute Loan: How Kabbage Is Upending Small 
Business Lending—And Building A Very Big Business, FORBES (May 25, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
darrendahl/2015/05/06/the-six-minute-loan-how-kabbage-is-upending-small-business-lending-and-building-a-
very-big-business/print/. 
 66 Indiegogo was chosen for this Comment for two reasons: it lists non-startups (as opposed to 
Kickstarter), and has options for both standard and “all or nothing” campaigns. 
 67 Whether this projection satisfies creditors and the court will likely be a § 1129(a)(11) question. See 
infra part III(F).  
 68 This is an ambitious, but not unreasonable, goal. For a discussion of crowdfunding success and failures, 
see infra part III(F). 
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of appreciation, [backers] get only the satisfaction of seeing an undertaking they 
support come to life.”69  
A real-life example may be illustrative of the rewards that Al’s can offer. 
“Idiom Brewing Co.” offers a backer tier labeled “Carry a Part of Us With You!” 
on its Indiegogo page.70 For $50, backers receive stickers and an “Idiom 
Brewing Co. 64oz Growler.”71 Logical consumers would not pay $50 solely for 
a growler and stickers; part of their bargained for exchange is also the knowledge 
that their contribution has helped the company grow or stay in business. In Al’s 
case, what Al’s chooses to offer backers is not particularly important so long as 
it can make a large profit off of each transaction. Reward levels can range from 
trivial to substantial. Idiom Brewing Co., for example, offers a $1000 reward 
tier including, among other physical gifts, access to twice yearly “limited edition 
release parties.”72 Presumably, Idiom spends little more than opportunity cost to 
bring this reward to fruition. If Al’s can follow suit, it will make a considerable 
profit.  
Regardless of what the rewards actually are, some research suggests that 
receiving them is often the driving factor in a backer’s decision to support a 
campaign.73 Other backers are not paying for a trinket however, but for a chance 
to feel good about themselves. As one paper acknowledged, “there is truth in the 
claim that crowdfunding is based by and large on people’s altruism.”74 Some 
commentators would term their transaction as one of “reciprocal altruism,” a 
behavioral concept where a long-term investment is made without the promise 
of immediate return.75 That said, just because the transaction is altruistic in 
nature does not preclude some immediate benefit to the backer; he may have 
paid $40 more for a growler then he would have at a store, but knowing that the 
extra $40 may have helped keep his favorite brewery in business more than 
makes up for the difference. It is up to project organizers to reward that altruism. 
 
 69 Cortese, supra note 4. 
 70 Idiom Brewing Co., INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/idiom-brewing-co#/ (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2018). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Cf. Paolo Crosetto and Tobias Renger, Crowdfunding: Determinants of success and funding 
Dynamics, THE JENA ECON. RES. PAPERS (2014) (noting that “an enhanced presence of pre-selling rewards and 
of rewards that confer social image to the pledger is positively correlated with project success”). 
 74 Paolo Crosetto, It’s Never Too Late for (Pre)-Sales: The Dynamics of Crowdfunding, PAOLO CROSETTO 
(Jan. 22. 2015), https://paolocrosetto.wordpress.com/2015/01/22/its-never-too-late-the-dynamics-of-crowdfunding/. 
 75 For a discussion about how “reciprocal altruism” has played both a legal and an evolutionary role in 
human development, see Scott Fruehwald, Reciprocal Altruism as the Basis for Contract, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. 
REV. 489 (2009). 
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As discussed in the next section, if backers receive nothing for their trouble, the 
crowdfunding system will struggle to grow. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Law Should Promote Trust in Crowdfunding 
Though backers are happy to pay for altruism, they require protection from 
fraud and negligence. This section discusses why that is, what the law can do 
about it, and why courts should care. Generally speaking, absent adequate and 
visible protections, confidence in any system as a whole will wane. Creating an 
avenue for backers to at least keep the “benefit” of their bargain—i.e., their 
physical “reward perks”—can serve as a protection that stays within the limits 
of the Code.76 Even if a campaign ultimately fails, providing debtors with 
another avenue towards reorganization can only further the Code’s twin aims of 
rehabilitation and creditor satisfaction, while at the same time adding a layer of 
trust to the crowdfunding sector. 
Trust is the key to any financial transaction.77 Rational consumers will only 
part with their money if they know they are going to get a return on their 
investment. As discussed infra in part II (C), though, the utility gained from that 
investment need not be solely financial, and “rational behavior does not 
necessarily always involve receiving the most monetary or material benefit 
because the satisfaction received could be purely emotional.”78 Further, the 
emotional appeal of participating in a crowdfunding campaign to save one’s 
 
 76 Crosetto, supra note 74. (noting that “project success seem[s] to have to do much more with sales than 
with altruism”). 
 77 For the purposes of this article, “trust” can be defined in the lay sense of the word. Legal scholars have, 
however, sought to qualify the concept further. For example, Timothy L. Fort & Liu Junhai write about three 
types of “trust”—“hard,” “real,” and “good”—of which “real trust” is most applicable to crowdfunding (“The 
idea underlying Real Trust is that customers, in particular, have reason to rely on the businesses that conduct 
commerce over the Internet.”) Timothy L. Fort & Liu Junhai, Chinese Business and the Internet: The 
Infrastructure for Trust, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1545, 1552 (2002); see also Michele Williams, In Whom 
We Trust: Group Membership as an Affective Context for Trust Development, 26 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 377, 378 
(2001) (noting that a more formal way of defining trust is “one’s willingness to rely on another’s actions in a 
situation involving the risk of opportunism”); Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1461 (2005) 
(“[T]rust [is] the voluntary ceding of control over something valuable to another person or entity, based upon 
one’s faith in the ability and willingness of that person or entity to care for the valuable thing.”). 
 78 See Rational Behavior, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rational-behavior.asp# 
ixzz4W6s0w8XJ (last viewed Jan. 15, 2018). 
TAMBURRO_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 5/30/2018 1:24 PM 
536 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
favorite family restaurant may also attract consumers that are acting 
irrationally.79  
At a micro level, without trust in a business, individual consumers will 
choose to patronize a competitor, or to withhold their funds entirely. At the 
macro level, such losses of confidence can have wide reaching consequences. In 
the crowdfunding realm, if rational consumers as a whole lose faith in the 
process, they will be less likely to participate. Ultimately, if crowdfunding can, 
in users’ estimation, harm them in ways against which they cannot protect 
themselves, users will be reluctant to embrace such technology—even if it is 
otherwise beneficial.”80  
More than just intuition supports this proposition. For example, Professors 
Timothy L. Fort and Liu Junhai examined the issues of trust in another market 
that was, at the time, not fully understood—E-commerce in China during the 
early 2000’s.81 The two concluded that: 
Over time, companies will learn that if they are to obtain repeat 
customers, they will need to replicate the relationship-building 
required to run a neighborhood shop. That is, they must keep 
promises [and] provide quality performance. The market itself acts 
as a disciplining mechanism to reach this kind of trust over a longer 
haul, but law plays an important role as well.82  
Further, they write, “In these situations, the rule of law . . . may be the most 
effective guarantor of the integrity of an E-commerce transaction.”83  
The rule of law can provide utility to the crowdfunding sector because it is 
particularly susceptible to fraud and negligence.84 This is due in large part to two 
factors. First, crowdfunding campaign managers often have little experience 
beyond their specialized type of business.85 In Jones’ case, for example, decades 
of experience running a pizzeria may be little help in the world of crowdfunding. 
 
 79 See Id. (“[B]ehavioral finance also analyzes irrational behavior on the part of the investor. This can 
include making decisions based primarily on emotional components, such as investing in a company the investor 
has positive feelings for even if financial models suggest the investment is not wise.”). 
 80 Justin Hurwitz, Trust and Online Interaction, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1579 (2013). 
 81 See generally Fort, supra note 75.  
 82 Id. at 1556. 
 83 Id. at 1560–61. 
 84 See generally Christopher Moores, Kickstart My Lawsuit: Fraud and Justice in Rewards-Based 
Crowdfunding, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383 (2015). 
 85 Cf. Katherine Bindley, Failed Kickstarter Project Bankrupts Seth Quest, Hanfree iPad Stand Inventor: 
Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/failed-kickstarter-
project-seth-quest-hanfree-ipad_n_2479798.html (The project head noted that “Once the manufacturers knew 
how much money he had to work with from [Kickstarter], they had the upper hand in negotiations.”). 
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Second, the unpredictability of a crowdfunding campaign can cause bizarre and 
unexpected issues to arise. For example, Flint & Tinder, a men’s underwear 
company, saw production costs balloon after its Kickstarter campaign raised ten 
times its goal, and the company found itself about 20,000 pairs of underwear 
short of demand.86  
Even campaigns that are initially successful are susceptible to massive 
failure. For example, Hanfree, a hands-free stand for tablets, was fully funded 
on Kickstarter for $35,000 before the project failed and its creator became 
insolvent.87 Similarly, Rebus, a British “claims management firm” entered 
administration, the UK’s equivalent of our bankruptcy system, despite raising 
over £800,000 on the platform Crowdcube.88 While these examples of 
negligence are somewhat well known, the prevalence of fraud has entered the 
public eye largely due to several catastrophic crowdfunding failures. The high-
tech motorcycle helmet manufacturer Skully, for example, squandered $2.5 
million in crowdfunds on, among other things, “apartment rent, grocery and 
restaurant bills, two Dodge Vipers, a rented Lamborghini, $2,000 spent at a strip 
club, and $2,345 worth of paintings.”89  
Herein lays the problem for crowdfunding projects: until crowdfunding 
portals break out of the realm of the early adopter, the public at large will view 
them with skepticism. This is especially true considering that crowdfunding lies 
in a sort of laissez-faire frontier with regards to regulation.90 Until it goes further 
into the mainstream, the crowdfunding sector needs to maintain the trust and 
support of its “early adopters”—those (relatively) few that have actually used 
crowdfunding.91 Law, and bankruptcy law in particular, provides one avenue for 
the protection of that trust.  
Returning to our hypothetical, Al’s Pizza has $500,000 in debt and needs of 
$25,000 for capital upgrades. The confirmation of Al’s plan relies on these 
capital investments; without them, the restaurant is unlikely to meet the revenue 
projections it needs to satisfy creditors. Al’s started a crowdfunding campaign 
 
 86 Alyson Shontell, How Raising $291,000 On Kickstarter Nearly Killed Underwear Startup Flint and 
Tinder, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/flint-and-tinder-jake-bronstein-
kickstarter-2012-12. 
 87 Bindley, supra note 75. 
 88 Adam Palin & Aime Williams, Rebus becomes largest crowdfunded failure, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016) 
https://www.ft.com/content/804d41c2-ca6d-11e5-be0b-b7ece4e953a0. 
 89 David Z. Morris, Suit Alleges Rampant Fraud at Collapsed HUD Helmet Maker Skully, FORTUNE (Aug. 
14, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/14/fraud-allegations-hud-skully/. 
 90 The JOBS Act was the first large scale attempt at federal oversight.  
 91 While one-fifth of Americans have participated in an online fundraising campaign of some sort, 61% 
of Americans have never heard of the term “crowdfunding.” Smith, supra note 57. 
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on Indiegogo.com with a goal of $25,000.92 As part of this goal, Al’s has created 
several rewards for backers who contribute certain sums of money. Some of 
these perks will be material, and those material perks will (ideally) be paid for 
out of the crowdfunding proceeds.93 Some of those perks will be intangible, such 
as future discounts, public recognition, or early access to new products. These 
rewards may not be available until the end of the campaign. For example, 
trinkets such as T-Shirts will likely be bought in bulk once Al’s can accurately 
tell how many it needs. Further, some gifts, such as access to a grand-reopening, 
may not be possible to provide until after the capital upgrades are complete.  
Assume that Al’s begins its campaign successfully and raises $12,000 in the 
first 15 days. Customer enthusiasm begins to wane, however, and $3,000 trickles 
in over the next two weeks, leaving Al’s with one month to raise the remaining 
$10,000. If he has chosen Indiegogo’s fixed funding plan, Jones must raise that 
$10,000, or the platform will cancel all the previous contributions.94 This would, 
of course, be very stressful for Jones on its own—but what if day 30 of the 
campaign was also the day he filed for chapter 11? 
B. Continuing the Crowdfund as an Executory Contract 
Regardless of which funding plan Al’s chose, creditors are liable to question 
whether entering bankruptcy should necessitate the cancelling of the campaign. 
While many creditors may approve of the campaign, others, especially those 
with liens subject to depreciation, may fear the added costs, risks, and 
uncertainty that adding another moving piece to the reorganization may bring. 
Creditors will also be wary of the possibility that rewards payments will shrink 
the estate. As a result, creditors may ask whether the ongoing campaign should 
be cancelled before the question of plan confirmation even arises. This section 
will argue that a crowdfunding campaign can be an executory contract and, 
therefore, can be analyzed (and continued) under § 365 of the Code.95 
 
 92 For simplicity, this Comment ignores the approximately 8% in fees (5% to Indiegogo, and between 3-
5% to payment processors) that Al’s would lose from each pledge. See Fees & Pricing for Campaigners: How 
Much Does Indiegogo Cost?, INDIEGOGO, https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/204456408 (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2018). Indiegogo, who may have $2400 at stake here, will pursue these funds as a traditional, 
unsecured creditor.  
 93 For a discussion of the implications of post-petition financing and § 364, see infra at Part III (E). 
 94 “Fixed funding” refers to a payment plan wherein funds are only released to a campaign organizer if 
the entire goal is met. On Indiegogo, both “fixed” and “flexible” funding, involve the same fees, and the only 
significant differences involve what types of payments are accepted. Fees, supra note 92. 
 95 As it is not relevant, this Comment will not discuss assignment of executory contracts, which is 
described in § 365(b) and (c).  
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Section 365(a) holds that “the trustee [or debtor-in-possession], subject to 
the court’s approval, may assume or reject any executory contract” of the 
debtor.96 The contract itself remains subject to the automatic stay, though; non-
debtors are required to perform their end of the contract until the debtor decides 
to assume or reject it, but the contract’s terms are “temporarily unenforceable 
against the debtor.”97 Should the debtor choose to continue to receive the 
benefits of the contract, the Supreme Court has held that the non-debtor is 
entitled to receive reasonable value for those goods or services “depending on 
the circumstances of a particular contract.”98 Further, if the debtor assumes an 
executory contract, “it must assume the entire contract cum onere—with all of 
its burdens.”99 
The first step of Al’s argument is to show that its crowdfunding campaign is 
based upon a contract between Al’s and its backers. This should not be hard 
because the transaction contains the traditional elements of a contract: the listing 
on a crowdfunding portal is an offer, which consumers accept; the two parties 
show a mutual assent, and have the capacity to do so; and the exchange of goods, 
services, or cash creates consideration.100 The foundation of a contract is further 
supported by legally operative101 language on IndieGoGo’s terms and conditions 
page that states, “Campaign Owners are legally bound to perform on any 
promise and/or commitment to Contributors (including delivering any 
 
 96 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012). 
 97 In re Travelot Co., 286 B.R. 462, 466 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002) (citing Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. N.H. 
Elec. Coop., Inc., (In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H.), 884 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir.1989)). 
 98 N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (1984) (“If the debtor-in-possession elects to 
continue to receive benefits from the other party to an executory contract pending a decision to reject or assume 
the contract, the debtor-in-possession is obligated to pay for the reasonable value of those services.”).  
 99 Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and Dot-Com Bankruptcies: 
Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts Including Intellectual Property Agreements, and 
Related Issues Under Section 365(c), and 365(e) and 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 307, 310 (2000). 
 100 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18 (3d ed. 1957). 
 101 The Uniform Commercial Code will generally support, and courts will generally uphold, a contract 
formed by one’s acceptance of a website’s terms and conditions, which are known as “clickwraps” or 
“browsewraps,” so long as the terms are not unconscionable. See Christopher Moores, Kickstart My Lawsuit: 
Fraud and Justice in Rewards-Based Crowdfunding, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383, 396 (2015). Courts have found 
a contract both where the user was aware that they were entering a contract and where the site put a reasonably 
prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract. Compare Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 
393, 402 (2nd. Cir. 2004) (finding likelihood of success on the merits in a breach of browsewrap claim where 
the defendant “admitted that it was fully aware of the terms” of the offer) with Van Tassell v. United Mktg., 795 
F.Supp.2d 770, 792–93 (E.D. Il. 2011) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause in browsewrap agreement that was 
only noticeable after a “multi-step process” of clicking through non-obvious links); see generally Nguyen v. 
Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Indeed, courts have consistently enforced 
browsewrap agreements where the user had actual notice of the agreement”). 
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perks).”102 If a contract exists, then, Al’s can use one of two theories, generally 
speaking, to show that it is executory.  
Courts have promulgated two basic ways to determine the “executoriness” 
of contracts.103 Executory contracts are not defined in § 365, and, in drafting the 
Code, Congress itself chose not to define such contracts.104 Section 365 does, 
however, allow for a trustee to rely on applicable state laws to assume or reject 
an executory contract.105 Professor Vern Countryman provided the earliest 
understanding of executory contracts in bankruptcy in 1973.106 Under the 
Countryman “material breach” test, an executory contract is one “under which 
the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far 
unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute 
a material breach excusing the performance of the other.”107 Thus, “[o]nly a 
contract that satisfied this test could be assumed by the estate.”108 The Third, 
Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted this view.109 
On the other hand, as the Fifth Circuit wrote, courts following the 
Countryman test “have worked needless and perhaps unconstitutional forfeitures 
of security interests.”110 As a result, many bankruptcy judges have abandoned 
the Countryman test in favor of more holistic approaches.111 However, these 
 
 102 Terms of Use, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/about/terms (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).  
 103 The progenitor case of executory contract theory in bankruptcy is Copeland v. Stephens, 106 E.R. 218 
(1818). In Copeland, “the King’s Bench held that a debtor’s obligations remaining under a lease could not be 
delegated in bankruptcy unless they were affirmatively assumed by the trustee.” In 1892, the United States 
Supreme Court adopted a similar view in Quincy v. Humphreys, where Chief Justice Fuller wrote that, with 
regards to assignees, . . . the law casts upon such assignee the legal title to the unexpired term of the lease, and 
he thus becomes assignee of the term by operation of law, unless, from prudential considerations, he elects to 
reject the term as being without benefit to the creditors. Quincy, Mo. & Pac. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 82, 
97 (1892). 
 104 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 58 (noting that “though there is no precise definition of what contracts are 
executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides.”). 
 105 11 U.S.C. § 365(C)(1)(a) (2012). This Comment will assume no interference from state laws. 
 106 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439 (1973). 
 107 Id. at 460. 
 108 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 236 
(1989). 
 109 Cf. In re Kiwi Int’l Air Lines, Inc., 344 F.3d 311, 317–18 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Sharon Steel 
Corp. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989)); Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal 
Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Newcomb, 
744 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Select-a-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 110 In re Austin Dev. Co., 19 F.3d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 111 See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection,” 59 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 845, 850 (1988) (arguing that the “principal effect” of Countryman’s definition “has been to produce 
substantial unnecessary confusion.”); Olin McGill & Hon. Francis G. Conrad, Exorcising Executoriness: 
Functionalist Arguments and Incantations to Avoid Meeting the Devil in the Woods, NORTON ANN. SURV. 
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tests have also been met with scholarly criticism. Professor Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, for example, derided the consideration of executory contracts as 
property of the estate in 1989: 
This view treats such contracts just like the two left shoes the trustee 
finds in the office cloakroom, to be sold if possible or abandoned if 
without value. This analysis will not do, however, because the trustee 
cannot merely sell or abandon a contract; the estate must pay for the 
rights it confers or pay damages for abandoning it, burdens that do not 
attach to the shoes.112 
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as many District and Bankruptcy courts 
(including the Southern District of New York) have adopted the functional 
approach “under which a contract is executory when the estate would benefit 
from the assumption or rejection of the contract.”113 In In re Jolly, for example, 
the Sixth Circuit wrote that the “strong Congressional policy of rehabilitating a 
debtor as effectively as possible by letting in the largest possible number of 
creditors” rendered the Countryman standard too rigid for many cases.114  
Contracts that courts have deemed executory under the functional approach 
are varied. A good example is In re Becknell, where the Sixth Circuit held that 
a lease-purchase agreement, which gave the purchaser a fee-simple interest in 
three million tons of coal, was executory because both creditor and debtor “had 
obligations to perform in the future.”115 The Sixth Circuit used similar reasoning 
in In re Jolly to disallow a debtor’s rejection because the contract was not “an 
obligation for the debtor to do something in the future.”116 
Whether the Countryman definition would provide favorable results for Al’s 
is unclear. If Al’s can persuade the court that failing to go forward with the 
crowdfund would give rise to a material breach claim by its backers, it may 
 
BANKR. L. 137, 144 (1994) (stating that functional approach emerged slowly due to frustration over 
Countryman’s test). 
 112 Westbrook, supra note 108, at 245. 
 113 Michelle Morgan Harner, Carl E. Black & Eric R. Goodman, Debtors Beware: The Expanding 
Universe of Non-Assumable/non-Assignable Contracts in Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 187, 191 
(2005); see In re Jolly, 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1978) (“Generally, they are agreements which include an 
obligation for the debtor to do something in the future)”; In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc., 138 B.R. 
687, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The concept of the ‘executory contract’ in bankruptcy should be defined in 
light of the purpose for which the trustee is given the option to assume or reject.”). 
 114 In re Jolly, 574 F.2d at 351; see also Westbrook, supra note 108, at 229–30 (arguing that the 
Countryman definition is too rigid in all cases and should be abandoned). 
 115 In re Becknell & Crace Coal Co., Inc., 761 F.2d 319, 322 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 116 In re Jolly, 574 F.2d at 351 (“In this case there is no obligation for the debtor to do anything in the 
future. His duty was in the past, he has breached that duty, and had judgment entered against him for that 
breach.”). 
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persuade a court using this standard. However, creditors may have a viable 
argument that the backers’ contributions are so small and diffuse that bringing 
those claims would be both meaningless and impossible.  
It is likely that crowdfunding debtors would prefer the functional approach 
because it casts a wider net than the Countryman definition.117 If Al’s used a 
fixed funding campaign, it will argue that, like the debtor in In re Becknell, both 
it and its creditors (the backers) have obligations to perform in the future—Al’s 
must provide the promised perks, and the backers must pay the promised 
pledges.118 Finally, because Al’s can benefit from a flexible funding campaign 
even if it were ceased halfway through (i.e., through the already received funds), 
such campaigns can also fall under the functional approach. This is true even if 
rewards are still due to backers because, as the Eleventh Circuit wrote, “Even 
though there may be material obligations outstanding on the part of only one of 
the parties to the contract, it may nevertheless be deemed executory under the 
functional approach.”119  
1. Assuming the Contract  
It is likely that Al’s will want to continue to crowdfund for three main 
reasons. First, even if the campaign is struggling, it represents the restaurant’s 
best option for gaining new capital. Second, depending on how far along the 
campaign is, Al’s may have invested funds in rewards, and its only way to 
recoup those expenditures will likely be through completing the campaign. 
Finally, Al’s will want to avoid disappointing its backers, especially if they are 
its literal last chance at a successful reorganization. Al’s will therefore most 
likely wish to assume the contract. 
If the crowdfunding contract is executory, a debtor-in-possession has the 
power to decide whether to assume it or to reject it, subject to court approval.120 
Especially with regard to assumption, though, approval is not guaranteed, as it 
“produce[s] a discontinuity with the normal rules for treatment of creditors 
[because] the estate itself becomes obligated on the contract, and the non-debtor 
 
 117 Executory contracts are property of the estate under § 541. See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., 
Inc., 138 B.R. at 702. 
 118 In a fixed funding campaign, backers are generally not charged until the campaign’s goal has been met. 
 119 See In re Gen. Dev. Corp., 84 F.3d 1364, 1374 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 120 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012). Professor Andrew argues that “rejection” is a misnomer and should be seen 
more as “non-assumption,” which changes the legal framework surrounding the court approval process 
significantly. Andrew, supra note 111, at 849–50. He writes that “Understanding that rejection does not affect 
contract liabilities demonstrates, for example, that litigation over whether rejection will be permitted is largely 
a pointless exercise.” Id. at 890. 
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party departs the ranks of ordinary creditors and becomes a priority claimant.”121 
Courts will generally analyze the debtor’s decision under the “business 
judgment” standard, which was favored by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. 
Bildisco.122  
The business judgment standard asks whether the decision to assume “is not 
materially different from any other investment decision made by a trustee,” and 
the court will ask “[w]hat use or disposition of the assets of the estate is best 
calculated to maximize the return to creditors.”123 Or, put differently, the test 
“requires only that the trustee demonstrate that rejection [or acceptance] of the 
executory contract will benefit the estate.”124 As courts are generally hesitant to 
overrule the trustee or debtor-in-possession with regards to business matters, 
then, the choice to assume or reject the contract is usually respected. Al’s 
creditors would therefore have to argue that Al’s choice to assume is the 
incorrect one. If they fail to do so, Al’s choice will stand. The creditors’ 
argument may hinge on risk, depreciation, or allegations of bad faith, but, as 
with the question of feasibility, discussed further in part III (F), Al’s would likely 
succeed. 
2. Rejecting the Contract 
Depending on the circumstances, Al’s may wish to reject the executory 
contract if it believes it will benefit the estate. As mentioned above, courts 
generally use the business judgment standard when evaluating the decision to 
reject an executory contract.125 If the contract is rejected, Al’s will not face 
liability for breach, meaning that backers, like so many other unsecured 
creditors, receive nothing. 
Rejection can raise a question that challenges the laissez-faire nature of 
crowdfunding regulation: what happens when a business simply chooses to 
renege on its plan to raise equity through loyal customers? On its face, it would 
seem odd to force a party to do something it is not contractually obligated to 
 
 121 Id. 
 122 N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984); see Andrew, supra note 111, at 895. 
 123 Andrew, supra note 111, at 895–96. 
 124 In re Stable Mews Assocs., Inc., 41 B.R. 594, 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). It should be noted that the 
S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court, as well as the D.C. Circuit, overruled parts of In re Stable Mews Assocs. with 
regards to a debtor’s decision to reject a contract when that rejection ran afoul of federal rent control guidelines. 
see In re Friarton Estates Corp. 65 B.R. 586, 590 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1986); Saravia v. 1736 18th Street, N.W., 
Ltd. P’ship 844 F.2d 823, 826 (D.C. Cir 1988). 
 125 See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526. 
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do.126 The party most obviously opposed to rejection of the contract is the 
backers. IndieGoGo, the crowdfunding platform, may also object on the basis 
that fees owed to it will be nullified by rejection. The analysis is also likely to 
be complicated here by creditors: if Al’s leaves funds on the table, creditors will 
lose out on a chance to see those funds turned into new capital and that capital 
turned into a higher rate of repayment. Even in a worst-case scenario, those 
already liquid assets can simply be added into the estate and distributed in 
chapter 7. The presence of these three interests compels a more careful 
consideration by the courts.127 To resolve the dispute, courts can again use the 
business judgment standard to evaluate crowdfunding obligations. 
As described above, bankruptcy courts “routinely defer to the business 
judgment of [a] chapter 11 debtor-in-possession with respect to decisions 
involving the management of the debtor’s property and the operation of the 
debtor’s business.”128 Courts may decline this deference, though, especially in 
the bankruptcy context, as “the directors of the chapter 11 debtor, however, are 
not empowered with carte blanche authority to run the company. The business 
judgment rule simply provides a presumption of propriety that ultimately may 
be refuted.”129  
Describing all the scenarios that could overcome such a presumption would 
likely go beyond the scope of this Comment. This is largely because, in the 
words of one commentator, “thousands of pages of corporate law scholarship 
and commentary have been devoted to these fundamental questions, yet we 
remain short of any broad consensus as to the answers.”130  
As this Comment is debtor-friendly, it is tempting to simply defer to both 
the debtor’s wishes and the law’s reluctance to force people into contracts.131 
 
 126 See Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 281 (7th Cir.1996) (Cudahy, J., 
concurring) (“Freedom not to contract should be protected as stringently as freedom to contract.”). 
 127 Adding a layer of scrutiny onto the business judgment rule is not unheard of; the Supreme Court did 
just that with regards to labor contracts in Bildisco. N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526. 
 128 Ann Marie Bredin & Mark G. Douglas, Bankruptcy Filing to Prevent Asset Sale Constitutes Bad Faith, 
2 BUS. RESTRUCTURING R. 10, 10 (2003). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 573 (2000); 
accord Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t A Rule — The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 
631, 631 (2002) (“The much misunderstood business judgment rule is not a “rule” at all.”). For a critique of the 
business judgment rule as favoring authority over accountability, as well as a proposed “new business judgment 
rule,” see D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business Judgment Rule, B.Y.U.L. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 15-
09 (Jun. 19, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2620536. 
 131 Todd D. Rakoff, Is “Freedom from Contract” Necessarily A Libertarian Freedom? 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
477, 477 (2004) (“Freedom from contract is a part of the human freedom the law wants to protect as it structures 
and maintains the institution of contract.”) (emphasis added). 
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That position would unfortunately run counter to a central position of this 
Comment; namely, that the law should foster trust in the crowdfunding sector. 
If courts allow crowdfunding debtors to avoid all liability for cancelling their 
campaigns without seriously evaluating the rejection decision, backers will lose 
confidence in the system and turn their wallets elsewhere. A court should take a 
serious look at any decision to reject. Even if the decision is sound, the court 
should do everything in its power to steer at least some benefit back to the 
backers, even if that benefit needs to be realized via § 105. As described 
previously in part III (A), not doing so could have serious repercussions for the 
crowdfunding sector as a whole. 
3. Default before Bankruptcy 
Regarding the campaign, if § 365 is invoked, § 365’s default provision may 
be difficult for Al’s to overcome because, even under ideal circumstances, Al’s 
prospects for curing, compensating or providing adequate protection are largely 
speculative. However, as discussed below, courts can allow Al’s to satisfy 
§ 365(b) in creative or flexible ways. 
A small business may have defaulted in some way on the crowdfunding 
campaign before filing for chapter 11. It may have overestimated the public’s 
willingness and ability to support it, for example, and therefore not been able to 
follow through on some part of its reward scheme.132 Section 365 requires 
debtors to cure defaults in executory contracts, or to provide adequate assurance 
of a prompt cure, before assuming them.133 Congress’s intent in imposing these 
conditions, the Second Circuit found, was “to insure that the contracting parties 
receive the full benefit of their bargain if they are forced to continue 
performance.”134 
It makes sense then for a court to simply reject any attempt by the debtor to 
assume a crowdfunding contract that it has, or will, default upon. This will be 
easy if those funds have not yet been collected from backers. However, if at least 
 
 132 Considering the often-token nature of crowdfunding rewards, a business in this boat likely has bigger 
concerns than having its chapter 11 plan confirmed. 
 133 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(a) (2012). 
 134 In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 85 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir. 1996); accord In re Superior Toy & 
Manufacturing Co., 78 F.3d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir.1996) (“‘If the trustee is to assume a contract or lease, the court 
will have to insure that the trustee’s performance under the contract or lease gives the other contracting party the 
full benefit of his bargain.”). 
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some of the funds made it into the hands of the debtor, creditors are likely to 
seek their inclusion in the estate as a means of solidifying their own claims.135  
Courts should not consider the question of a defaulted upon executory 
contract inflexibly. As the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New 
York described in In re Evelyn Brynes, Inc., “the legislative history of the Code 
shows that [the terms ‘adequate assurance’] were intended to be given a 
practical, pragmatic construction.”136 Although In re Evelyn Brynes concerned 
§ 365’s treatment of the assignment of leases, its flexible interpretation can 
apply just as well to executory contracts: 
Congress did not mandate that the courts require the assignee to 
literally comply with each and every term of the lease. It has 
entrusted to the courts the determination, on a case-by-case basis, 
of the meaning of the term “adequate assurance,” taking into 
account whether the [debtor’s] opposition to the assignment is 
“based upon reason and [is] not arbitrary or capricious.”137 
 In re Evelyn Brynes suggests that a small business can provide adequate 
assurance in any number of ways. Courts should evaluate adequate assurance 
based on the particular circumstances of each case. If Al’s defaulted on its 
crowdfunding obligations because the crowdfund was unsuccessful, there may 
be no way in which adequate assurance can be guaranteed. Conversely, 
supposing that Al’s was unable to purchase and distribute rewards because funds 
from the campaign went straight to other creditors, a court may reckon that, with 
the automatic stay in place, Al’s can use post-petition crowdfunds to promptly 
cure any defaults. 
One could also suppose that Al’s might attempt to cure the default in the 
crowdfund by promising the rewards to be given after its grand re-opening—an 
undetermined date well after the confirmation of his chapter 11 plan. In this 
scenario, courts are going to need to choose between the two sets of claimants—
the backers and the creditors. This choice may boil down to a simple fact 
determination considering the surrounding circumstances of the campaign, and 
a sympathetic court may accept Al’s plans. That said, it may be more prudent to 
simply include these funds in the estate, and hope that backers will gain some 
 
135 In this instance, and as described further in part II (C) creditors would argue that any monies collected 
from the (pre-petition) crowdfund are property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1) (2012). If these funds 
are property of the estate, and the executory contract is in default, it is in the creditor’s best interest to ensure 
that the crowdfunds remain property of the estate.  
 136 In re Evelyn Byrnes, Inc., 32 B.R. 825, 828–29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 137 Id. at 829 (citations omitted). 
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altruistic benefit from knowing that their contribution at least gave their (now 
liquidated) favorite business some breathing room in chapter 7.  
C. Crowdfunds as a Contingent Interest 
The concept of contingent interests provides Al’s with another avenue to 
keep its campaign running if § 365 fails. In the case of all or nothing, rewards-
based campaigns, a project organizer may have a contingent interest in the funds 
he would raise should the campaign continue.138 If those funds are contingent, 
they become property of the estate. As described above with regards to § 365, 
the concept of contingent interests creates a double-edged sword for Al’s: if the 
funds are a part of the estate, creditors will be able to eventually reach them. 
However, if creditors know that they will receive at least some benefit from the 
crowdfund should Al’s enter chapter 7, they will have less incentive to object to 
the campaign’s continuation. This breathing room can give Al’s both time and 
space to complete the crowdfund and, ideally, to use the received funds to 
successfully reorganize. It is therefore in the interests of both Al’s and its 
creditors for the proceeds of the crowdfund to be classified as contingent.  
Although no courts have addressed whether withheld crowdfunds qualify as 
a contingent interest, § 541(a) is broad enough to include them. Most courts 
interpret § 541(a) broadly, and property of the estate has been stretched to 
include “speculative” interests. As the Second Circuit ruled, “[E]very 
conceivable interest of the debtor, future, nonpossessory, contingent, 
speculative, and derivative, is within the reach of § 541.”139 Among other 
prospective causes, courts have held that potential claims asserted against 
insurance companies140 and the right to receive per capita distribution of 
earnings from a tribe’s gaming activity by a member of that tribe in the event 
that it chose to distribute those funds141 are contingent interests.142 Also 
illustrative are the cases wherein courts have held that such contingent interests 
are property of the estate even if some post-petition action must be taken in order 
 
 138 See Contingent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Possible; uncertain; unpredictable; 
Dependent on something that might or might not happen in the future; conditional.”). 
 139 Chartschlaa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 140 Id. at 123. 
 141 In re Kedrowski, 284 B.R. 439, 449 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2002) (finding the prospective distribution a 
“property right”). 
 142 See also In re Goins, 181 B.R. 45, 47 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (future wages); In re Carlton, 309 B.R. 
67, 75 (Bankr. S. D. Fla. 2004) (stock options); In re Moyer, 421 B.R. 587, 590–91 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) 
(increase in value of stock of wholly-owned corporation); In re Anders, 151 B.R. 543, 547 (Bankr. D. Nev. 
1993) (post-petition spousal payments). 
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for the interests to be realized.143 Further, the Supreme Court added an element 
of temporality to the analysis in Segal v. Rochelle by holding that a payment was 
contingent because it was “sufficiently rooted in the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy 
past.”144 As a dissent in a Tenth Circuit case decades later noted, however, 
finding a line between “contingencies” and “mere expectancies” is still crucial 
for courts.145  
If the court accepts that Al’s campaign, which was conceived, begun, and 
operating before it filed for bankruptcy, is sufficiently rooted in the pre-petition 
period, then, it must determine whether the realization of those funds is indeed 
contingent. It can do so by looking at both the crowdfunding market in general 
and the facts specific to Al’s case. The court’s determination of the contingent 
issue will be complicated somewhat by one of the peculiarities of crowdfunding. 
IndieGoGo claims that campaigns raise, on average, 42% of their total during 
the first three and last three days of their duration.146 This fact can play into a 
debtor’s favor; even if Al’s is behind its projected earnings, it can honestly 
suggest that contributions are more likely to increase as the campaign nears its 
deadline.  
A more comprehensive look at the crowdfunding landscape is provided by 
Wharton School of Business Professor Ethan Mollick. Mollick, at the request of 
Kickstarter, developed an independent study of “nearly 500,000” backers with 
which the platform had interacted.147 Mollick found that, among other things, 
“[p]roject backers should expect a failure rate of around 1-in-10 projects, and to 
receive a refund 13% of the time . . . . Ultimately, there does not seem to be a 
systematic problem associated with failure (or fraud) on Kickstarter, and the vast 
majority of projects do seem to deliver.”148 However, because Kickstarter is a 
vastly different platform from IndieGoGo, as it deals almost exclusively in 
“products” and not in services (unlike IndieGoGo, which supports both), 
 
 143 See In re Mid-Island Hosp., Inc., 276 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2002) (hospital’s “speculative” and 
“intangible” interest in funds withheld contingent on the satisfaction of its obligations to the State was property 
of the estate). 
 144 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966); see also In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th Cir. 
2010) (“Like stock options, the fact that the [interests] are contingent on post-petition events does not mean that 
Debtors’ interest in them is not rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past.”).  
 145 In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d at 1213 (Holloway, J., dissenting); see also In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. 
628, 633 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013) (finding that bonus payments due after filing are not property of the estate 
because the employer had “absolute discretion” whether to award them). 
 146 Amy Yeh, New Research Study: 7 Stats from 100,000 Crowdfunding Campaigns, INDIEGOGO (Oct. 6, 
2015), https://go.indiegogo.com/blog/2015/10/crowdfunding-statistics-trends-infographic.html. 
 147 The Kickstarter Fulfillment Report, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/fulfillment (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
 148 Id. 
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Mollick’s findings do not apply perfectly to Al’s situation. Indeed, a report by 
London-based market research firm The Crowdfunding Centre found that, in 
2015, only 13% of IndieGoGo campaigns ended fully funded.149  
It should be noted that these numbers are likely skewed by projects that are 
doomed from the start. For example, on November 5, 2016, the author found a 
campaign titled “Help Jump Start My Business! Chance to Win $2,000!” The 
campaign was organized by a would-be stock guru attempting to raise $10,000 
to start his career as a trader. The project organizer’s sole reward category was 
an entry to win $2,000. On March 5, 2017, the campaign had raised $0.150 For 
comparison, in a campaign called “Modern Milk: A unique mom & baby 
wellness center,” a small business raised 103% of its $25,000 goal.151 Keeping 
this in mind, a sympathetic judge may be justified in doubting The 
Crowdfunding Centre’s 13% figure, at least as applied to the case in front of her.  
In Al’s case, a simpler solution would be to ask the court to make a judgment 
call as to whether it believes Al’s campaign will reach its goal and receive its 
funds. Courts can consider several factors for this test. As suggested previously 
in part II (C), Al’s could argue that its loyal and widespread swath of customers 
is more likely than not to help it fully fund the campaign. Of course, the 
discouraging crowdfunding statistics described above will have less effect on 
the judge if the campaign is on track to hit or exceed its goal. Proving this by 
sticking to the particular facts of its case should allow Al’s to convince a court 
that, like so many other varied interests, its potential crowdfunding earnings are 
contingent. 
D. Operating the Crowdfund Using Estate Property via § 363  
If the crowdfund can proceed and the crowdfunds do enter into the estate, 
some creditors may look to object to specific parts of its mechanics. Most 
prominent of those mechanics is the fact that estate property will be used, in 
some ways, to both operate the crowdfund and to bring rewards to fruition. 
Arguably, § 363 permits the court to allow such use of estate property. 
 
 149 Catherine Clifford, Less than a Third of Crowdfunding Campaigns Reach Their Goals, ENTREPRENEUR 
(Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/269663. 
 150 See Daniel McGuire, Help Jump Start My Business! Chance to Win $2,000!, INDIEGOGO, 
https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/help-jump-start-my-business-chance-to-win-2-000-entrepreneur#/ (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
 151 See Stephanie Nguyen, Modern Milk: A Unique Mom & Baby Wellness Center, INDIEGOGO, 
https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/modern-milk-a-unique-mom-baby-wellness-center-lifestyle-
health/x/15370259#/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
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The Code acknowledges that business owners are usually the ones most 
likely to successfully manage their reorganizations.152 Specifically, §§ 1107 and 
1108 allow the debtor-in-possession to act as trustee and continue to run the 
business. Thus, the Code allows business owners the latitude to run their 
reorganizing businesses as they see fit, with few limitations. Two of those 
notable limitations are found in §§ 363 and 364.  
Section 363 concerns the use, sale, or lease of property of the estate by the 
trustee or debtor-in-possession.153 In the crowdfunding arena, § 363 is likely to 
arise in the context of “use” of the property by the debtor to fulfill its reward 
obligations.154 For example, creditors will object (rationally or otherwise) to 
Al’s spending money on providing T-shirts and tasting parties to backers when 
it owes them money, especially if property securing that money (e.g., the pizza 
oven) is depreciating in value.155 Creditors may also use § 363 to object to the 
“use” of cash collateral. For example, Al’s suppliers will likely seek to stop any 
cash collateral that they have an interest in from being used in the crowdfunding 
campaign.156 Conversely, though, Al’s may see these “uses” as his best way of 
escaping his debt predicament, despite what his creditors may think.  
Section 363 tries to strike a balance between debtor autonomy and creditor 
oversight by relying on the “ordinary course of business” standard to evaluate 
debtor decisions regarding use of property of the estate. Section 363(c) states 
that a trustee “may enter into transactions, including the sale or lease of property 
of the estate, in the ordinary course of business, without notice or a hearing, and 
may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business without notice 
or a hearing.”157 This means that Al’s is free to use its property to crowdfund 
without court approval, so long as the crowdfund is within the ordinary course 
of business. If its creditors wish to stop the crowdfund, then, they must (a) show 
that it is not within the ordinary course of business, therefore triggering a 
 
 152 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. 612, 615–16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“Indeed, the Code favors 
the continued operation of a business by a debtor and a presumption of reasonableness attaches to a debtor’s 
management decisions”). Allowing a debtor-in-possession to continue to manage his business also protects the 
objectivity of the involved judge. The House Judiciary Committee admitted as much, writing that “it is an easy 
matter for a bankruptcy judge to feel personally responsible for the success or failure of a case. Bankruptcy 
judges frequently view a case as ‘my case’. The institutional bias thus generated magnifies the likelihood of 
unfair decisions in the bankruptcy court. H.R. REP. 95-595 at 91, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6052.  
 153 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012). 
 154 “Use” is interpreted broadly. See In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(“application of funds derived from airline operations” to satisfy lease obligations constituted use). 
 155 This analysis assumes that secured creditors will not raise adequate protection claims under § 363(e). 
 156 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2012). 
 157 Id. § 363(c)(1). 
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hearing, and (b) convince the court to refuse authorization of the campaign under 
§ 363(c)(1).  
1. Ordinary Course of Business 
Al’s campaign will be evaluated for § 363 purposes under the ordinary 
course of business standard. The ordinary course of business standard is intended 
to protect ordinary trade transactions between a debtor and a creditor.158 To fall 
within the ordinary course of business, an action taken by the debtor-in-
possession must satisfy a two-pronged test. The “vertical” prong requires that 
the debtor’s action be reasonably anticipated by all parties in interest given the 
range and scope of the business. The “horizontal” prong asks whether similarly 
situated businesses would have engaged in such conduct. As the Eighth Circuit 
wrote in Lovett v. St. Johnsbury Trucking, “[T]here is no precise legal test which 
can be applied” to determine what transactions occur in the ordinary course of 
business, “rather, th[e] court must engage in a ‘peculiarly factual’ analysis.”159 
Like the business judgment rule, this standard is flexible. As the Southern 
District of New York ruled in In re Johns-Manville Corp., the ordinary course 
of business standard is “purposely not defined so narrowly as to deprive a debtor 
of the flexibility it needs to run its business and respond quickly to changes in 
the business climate.”160 As a result, “[t]he § 363 mandate necessarily includes 
the concomitant discretion to exercise reasonable judgment in ordinary business 
matters.”161 
Satisfying the vertical prong of the test will be the more difficult burden for 
Al’s to overcome. As the Southern District of New York held in In re James 
Phillips, Inc., “The touchstone of ‘ordinariness’ is thus the interested parties’ 
reasonable expectations of what transactions the debtor in possession is likely to 
enter in the course of its business.”162 In other words, the test asks “whether the 
transaction subjects a creditor to economic risks of a nature different from those 
 
 158 John Kane, Litigating the Ordinary Course of Business Defense Summary Judgment and the Stanziale 
v. Industrial Specialists Decision, INSOLVENCY INSIGHTS (Sep. 30, 2015), https://insolvencyinsights. 
com/2015/09/30/litigating-the-ordinary-course-of-business-defense-summary-judgment-and-the-stanziale-v-
industrial-specialists-decision/. 
 159 Lovett v. St. Johnsbury Trucking, 931 F.2d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1991). Note that the ordinary course of 
business standard used in §§ 363 and 364 is the same as, and is arguably derived from, that used in § 547. See 
In re Poff Const., Inc., 141 B.R. 104, 105 (W.D. Va. 1991) (“Not finding a definition of that phrase within the 
Bankruptcy Code, the lower court turned to cases from other jurisdictions interpreting ‘ordinary course of 
business’ in the context of § 547 dealing with preferences.”). 
 160 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. 612, 617 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 161 Id. at 616. 
 162 In re James A. Phillips, Inc., 29 B.R. 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 
60 B.R. at 616. 
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he accepted when he decided to extend credit.”163 Considering the fact intensive 
nature of the risks that the campaign will impose on creditors, a court’s view on 
whether the vertical relationship in Al’s case is hard to predict. For example, in 
In re Roth American, Inc. the Third Circuit found that the specific facts of a 
collective bargaining agreement were “extraordinary” enough to push said 
agreement outside the normal course of business, despite the fact that such 
agreements “routinely” satisfied the horizontal prong.164  
Similarly, Al’s creditors may argue that it never expected a pizza shop to get 
involved with online fundraising, and that even if it did, the type of fundraising 
Al’s is engaged in is on a scale significantly beyond what they had expected. 
While there are no guarantees, Al’s will likely be able to reply that continuing 
the crowdfund adds no significant risk besides depreciation and opportunity 
cost, especially if the campaign is well designed. Al’s could ease creditor’s 
minds, for example, by ensuring that rewards are paid for exclusively by income 
from the campaign. Further, if the campaign is only scheduled for a few months, 
these risks will be minimal. 
A crowdfunding business should pass the horizontal test relatively simply. 
To satisfy this test, Al’s must show that the crowdfund “conformed to standard 
practices in the [pizzeria] industry as a whole.”165 At best, Al’s would be able to 
show that crowdfunding is a new normal in the small business sphere, as 
discussed supra in part II (B). At worst, Al’s should be able to compare 
crowdfunding favorably with other types of promotional campaigns in which 
pizzerias normally partake.166 A close comparison might be a fundraising night, 
where Al’s agrees to donate a token percentage of its receipts for one evening to 
a local school or organization. Like the crowdfund, the fundraiser sacrifices 
liquid capital in exchange for long term gains, although in the case of the latter, 
these gains take the form of both community goodwill and the potential for 
 
 163 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. at 616. 
 164 In re Roth American, Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 953 (3d Cir. Pa. 1992) (noting that the “agreement is 
fundamentally different from the previous collective bargaining agreements entered into between Roth American 
and the Teamsters insofar as it contains the provision purporting to bind Roth American to maintain its 
operations”). 
 165 Courts have wide discretion to decide this inquiry. See In re Blitz U.S.A. Inc., 475 B.R. 209, 214 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (continuation of an incentive-based bonus plan was a common industry practice, and 
satisfied the horizontal prong); In re Glosser Bros., Inc., 124 B.R. 664, 668 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (holding 
that it was common industry practice for department store like debtor to license others to operate certain 
departments, and for store to terminate license when it was dissatisfied with performance of licensee.”) 
 166 Promotional actions can satisfy the horizontal prong. Cf. In re Atlanta Retail, Inc. 287 B.R. 849, 857 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002) (“For a calculated financial exposure, [debtor] gained immeasurable promotional 
exposure. Examined in this context, it is hard for this Court to imagine a similarly situated financially distressed 
debtor, attempting to restructure, that would not enter into such a promotion.”). 
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increased business. Again, because the risks to creditors are relatively low in this 
situation, and given the wide authority debtors-in-possession are allowed by 
§§ 1107 and 1108, courts should at least consider the feasibility of the 
crowdfund before rejecting it outright at this stage.167 
2. Cash Collateral 
In a similar fashion, creditors can attack the use of cash collateral through 
§ 363(c)(2), which holds that trustees cannot use, sell, or lease cash collateral 
without consent of entities with an interest (i.e., creditors) or court authorization 
after a hearing. Because of the adequate protection requirement of § 363(e), the 
cash collateral concept is likely a creditor’s best option for reigning in Al’s 
crowdfund.  
Al’s already-received crowdfunds may be cash collateral. Section 363(a) 
defines cash collateral as “cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, 
securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in 
which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest . . . .”168 
Section 363 also holds that the “proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits 
of property” subject to a lien are cash collateral.169 Section 552(b)(1) continues 
the creditor’s security interest in the proceeds of the inventory collateral.170 If 
funds raised as part of the campaign can be traced as “proceeds, products, or 
offspring” to property encumbered by a future acquired property clause, they 
will be considered cash collateral.171  
The cash collateral issue is most likely to be raised by Al’s suppliers. If the 
supplier succeeds in showing that Al’s is using cash collateral in which it has an 
interest, absent consent, Al’s must get court authorization to do so “in 
accordance with the provisions” of § 363(c)(2)(B).172 Courts generally see this 
edict as a reference to § 363(e), which requires a debtor to provide adequate 
protection in exchange for the use of cash collateral.173 In a contested hearing, 
 
 167 Feasibility is discussed in detail infra at Part III (F). 
 168 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (2012). 
 169 Id. 
 170 William L. Norton Jr., § 94:6. Cash collateral (Code § 363), NORTON BANKRUPTCY L. PRACTICE (Jan. 
2018). 
 171 Id. (“[I]f the debtor has granted a prepetition security interest in particular assets to a lender or other 
creditor, the proceeds of that prepetition collateral that fall within the definition of cash collateral will also be 
cash collateral.”) 
 172 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
 173 In re George Ruggiere Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 727 F.2d 1017, 1019, (11th Cir. 1984) (“[t]he principal 
restraint on use of cash proceeds is found in § 363(e), which specifies that the court shall condition the use of 
the secured property ‘as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest’”). 
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the pre-petition lender has the burden to prove the “validity, priority or extent” 
of its interest in cash collateral.174  
The objected “use” of cash collateral in this situation can take several forms. 
Suppose that Al’s purchases $1000 of cheese from a supplier on credit. Al’s then 
uses the cheese to earn $1500 in sales. § 552(b)(1) allows the supplier to claim 
an interest in that income as “proceeds, products, or offspring” of the original 
credit.175 If Al’s spends that money on shirts or fees for a crowdfunding 
campaign, the supplier will naturally be worried about its investment. Unless 
Al’s suppliers consent to the use of the cash collateral in which they have an 
interest, Al’s will need to provide the supplier with adequate protection in one 
of the ways prescribed by § 361. For a small business, such as Al’s, consent is a 
possibility, especially if it is dealing with another small business. For example, 
if Al’s receives its dairy products from a local farm, the farm’s owners may 
reason that spoiling its relationship with a local customer is a sub-optimal 
solution. For larger suppliers, such as condiment wholesalers, retaining a full 
interest will likely outweigh any loyalty to one of many customers. With that in 
mind, Al’s would do well to make sure that it can adequately protect that interest 
before it considers fighting for its campaign proceeds. If adequate protection 
creates a severe burden on Al’s, it may endanger the campaign.  
E. Paying for Rewards through § 364 
This section suggests that § 364, which concerns the steps debtors-in-
possession must take to obtain credit, is the avenue by which crowdfunding 
debtors can fulfill their obligations to backers. Debtors may argue that, because 
the “debt” accrued through the campaign (i.e., the obligations to backers) is 
going to be paid for, essentially, by those consumers, § 364 is a dead end. Put 
more simply, the rewards a backer expects are being paid for by her contribution. 
Creditors are of course not likely to accept this argument. Instead, they will 
contend that the crowdfunding campaign falls under § 364(a) or (b) because it 
is, in effect, an attempt to obtain credit.176 In other words, the crowdfund creates 
new debt for the estate in the form of both the rewards promised to backers, and 
any monies spent procuring and providing those rewards should become estate 
 
 174 In re Kleibrink, 346 B.R. 734, 761 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that while a debt did exist, the 
creditor’s failure to supply evidence of its existence prevented the Court from lifting the automatic stay). 
 175 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012). 
 176 § 364(c) and (d) will not apply because Al’s will have no difficulty “obtaining” credit. Where, for 
example, a bank may require § 364(c) or (d) protection as a condition of the loan, the crowdfund has no such 
obligation. 
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property regardless of their source. Courts have indeed recognized that “[d]ebt 
need not be trade debt in order to qualify as [a] postpetition obligation incurred 
‘in ordinary course of business.’”177 
If the pledged rewards are a post-petition obligation, courts can allow 
debtors to uphold their commitments by classifying them as administrative 
expenses, which receive second priority under § 507.178 While backers would of 
course prefer this priority status, unsecured creditors will rationally see it as a 
shrinking of the pie, especially if the reorganization eventually fails and the 
company is liquidated. Debtors will prefer to operate in § 364(a), which allows 
taking unsecured credit as an administrative expense without court approval. 
The court’s determination of whether the crowdfund falls within the ordinary 
course of business would largely mirror the one analyzed with regards to § 363 
in part III (C), supra. Further, some courts have focused only on the vertical 
creditor expectation test with regards to § 364 (this analysis would also mirror 
the one discussed supra).179  
If the campaign is not within the ordinary course of business, the court will 
hold a § 364(b) hearing.180 Creditors will use that hearing to persuade the judge 
to either give priority to their own claims over the crowdfunding debts or to 
disallow the campaign outright. However, the latter discussion may not be 
necessary. If backers are pushed too far down the priority ladder, their rewards 
will never be realized, and the campaign will likely be rendered unnecessary.  
F. Plans Relying on Crowdfunding can be Feasible 
A reorganization plan can pass the feasibility requirement of § 1129(a)(11). 
The risk lurking behind any discussions of debtor crowdfunding is liquidation. 
If a debtor encumbers itself with crowdfunding obligations and still ends up in 
chapter 7, creditors will have lost time and opportunity cost while waiting for 
the campaign to play out. Further, if things go poorly, paying for the 
crowdfunding obligations may shrink the size of the estate. While courts should 
be happy to provide debtors with more options to save themselves, there must 
be limits to how much deference debtors-in-possession receive.  
 
 177 In re Poff Const., Inc., 141 B.R. 104, 106 (W.D. Va. 1991). 
 178 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (2012). 
 179 See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 15.04 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.); cf. In 
re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, 186 B.R. 414, 428 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“Section 364(a) does not require the court to 
analyze industry wide practices to determine whether a particular transaction was within the debtor’s ordinary 
course of business.”). 
 180 11 U.S.C. § 364(b) (2012). 
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Once again, though, bankruptcy courts already have a tool at their disposal 
to protect creditors in this position: § 1129(a)(11). This section conditions 
confirmation of the plan on it being not likely to be “followed by the liquidation, 
or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to 
the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed 
in the plan.”181 In practice, this stipulation is known as the feasibility 
assessment,182 although some courts have merged the doctrine into § 1129(a)(3), 
which requires that a plan be proposed in good faith.183 
“The purpose of section 1129(a)(11),” says Colliers, “is to prevent 
confirmation of visionary schemes which promise[] creditors and equity security 
holders more under a proposed plan than the debtor can possibly attain after 
confirmation.”184 As a result, a guarantee of successful reorganization is not 
necessary, and the threshold of proving a feasible plan is low.185  
Under that most basic guideline, one would expect a crowdfund that is low 
risk and trending towards completion to be confirmable. However, more specific 
considerations will draw the court’s attention. These will include, for example, 
whether the crowdfunding can provide adequate cash flow to meet continuing 
obligations, or whether the crowdfunding will be able to supply a capital 
infusion adequate to meet continuing obligations and allow continued operation. 
The analysis will necessarily be fact heavy; for example, in In re Wetdog, LLC, 
the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia found that “as long as 
the condition and appearance” of a Savannah Inn “[was] maintained to the 
satisfaction of the rating agencies and advertising is adequate,” revenue would 
be “automatic,” and the plan was therefore feasible.186 That same court came to 
a different conclusion in In re HSD Partners, LLC, where it held that despite a 
 
 181 Id. § 1129(a)(11). 
 182 See Richard I. Aaron, The Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 
§ 12:14. 
 183 In re Pikes Peak Water Co., 779 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Not confirming the plan for lack 
of good faith is appropriate particularly when there is no realistic possibility of an effective reorganization and 
it is evident that the debtor seeks merely to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of secured creditors to enforce 
their rights.”). 
 184 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). The 
classic case illustrating this point is (or at least should be) In re Trans Max Technologies, where then-Judge 
Markell declined to confirm a plan that relied on the debtor company developing a flying car in three years 
without incurring any debt. In re Trans Max Techs., Inc., 349 B.R. 80, 95 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006).  
 185 See In re Brotby, 303 B.R. 177, 192–93 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (Bankruptcy Court’s finding as to 
feasibility of a plan relying on a 60-year-old computer programmer increasing his income 10% per year over 8 
years was not clearly erroneous); In re Proud Mary Marina Corp., 338 B.R. 114, 132 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) 
(plan proponent not required to guarantee success, just reasonable assurance). 
 186 In re Wetdog, LLC, 518 B.R. 126, 137–38 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2014). 
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debtor’s “draconian cost cutting attempts,” its revenue could not meet continued 
operating needs and its plan was therefore unfeasible.187 Al’s revenue 
projections based on the capital infusion therefore need to be realistic. 
Other facts that a court may consider in the feasibility analysis may include: 
(1) the adequacy of the debtor’s capital structure; (2) the earning power of the 
business; (3) related economic conditions; (4) the ability of management; (5) the 
probability of the continuation of the same management; and (6) any other 
related matter which determines the prospects of a sufficiently successful 
operation to enable performance of the provisions of the plan.188  
In Al’s case, the debtors can show: (1) the crowdfund will add a minimal 
amount of burden into the estate while adding significant, and needed, capital; 
(2) the added capital will increase earning power by increasing efficiency and 
seating capacity; (3) the state of both the local restaurant market and the 
crowdfunding market as a whole are conducive to growth and capital formation, 
respectively; (4) that Jones can successfully run his business under the plan; and 
(5) that Jones will continue to do so. More than just bankruptcy policy supports 
a finding of feasibility. If the court decides to confirm Al’s plan, the risks to 
creditors are likely minimal. If the court holds that the plan is unfeasible, the 
chilling effect upon both potential backers and potential crowdfunders, as 
described supra in part III (A), may cause negative externalities for the 
crowdfunding industry.  
CONCLUSION 
Small businesses can, and often do, fail for any number of reasons, be they 
unpredictable, seemingly inconsequential, or downright bizarre. During the 
writing of this Comment, in fact, two businesses outside of Emory University’s 
front door closed for starkly different reasons. Casual restaurant Slice and Pint 
shuttered after a competitor broke its local monopoly on both pizza and alcohol. 
Two doors down, Daankbar Taco closed after its owner was charged with first 
degree homicide by vehicle.189 Mentioning these misfortunes illustrates a point: 
the small business world is fraught with danger.  
 
 187 In re HSD Partners, LLC, No. 10-40295, 2011 WL 7268051 3 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011). 
 188 See In re Sagewood Manor Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 223 B.R. 756, 763 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1998); In re Greate 
Bay Hotel & Casino Inc., 251 B.R. 213, 226–27 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000). 
 189 Chris Fuhrmeister, Bad Dog Taqueria Owner Tracy Mitchell Charged in Fatal Hit-and-Run, EATER 
ATLANTA (Nov.12, 2015), http://atlanta.eater.com/2015/11/12/9723962/tracy-mitchell-hit-and-run-bad-dog-
taqueria-owner.  
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The hope for this Comment’s proposed framework is for it to empower small 
businesses, and the lawyers advising them, to have the confidence in the power 
of the crowd. The crowd represents an immeasurable opportunity for anyone to 
turn social capital into fiscal capital. Small businesses are uniquely situated to 
take advantage of that opportunity, and courts should not interfere with such a 
burgeoning market. Dialectics aside, capitalism works best when options are 
plentiful for both consumers and producers.190 Just as Al’s customers benefit 
from having multiple pizzerias in town, so does Al’s itself benefit from having 
multiple ways in which to raise capital. Crowdfunding can serve as an avenue 
for such a venture.  
As both the Supreme Court191 and Congress192 have acknowledged, the law 
can and should play a role in fostering competition. The same attitude should 
prevail in the capital raising market.193 The passage of the JOBS Act signaled 
that Congress has actively encouraged competition in the capital foundation 
market. Further, the relatively low risks of non-equity crowdfunding make it a 
prime candidate for a hands-off approach, both from regulators (as recognized 
by the JOBS Act) and from the courts. Because law can foster trust, courts can 
and indeed should try to protect the integrity of the crowdfunding system.  
Bankruptcy courts can play their part in this crowdfunding push by ensuring 
that backers are given every opportunity to receive the benefit of their bargain. 
By using the options already presented to them within the Code, courts can do 
so efficiently. More importantly, courts can give backers the chance to reap the 
benefit of their bargain while remaining faithful to the Code’s twin aims of 
rehabilitation and equitable distribution.  
Bankruptcy courts already possess the means by which crowdfunding will 
be assessed. Debtor businesses should be able to continue their crowdfunding 
campaigns, if necessary, using the executory contract doctrine of § 365 or the 
contingent interest concept found in § 541. Section 363 should provide an 
avenue by which the debtor-in-possession can continue to crowdfund without 
debtor interference, and § 364 can allow the debtor to uphold his end of the 
bargain with regards to backer’s rewards. Perhaps most importantly, 
 
 190 Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition Always Good?, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 162, 162 (2013) 
(“Promoting competition is broadly accepted as the best available tool for promoting consumer well-being.”). 
 191 Standard Oil Co v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of our national economic policy long 
has been faith in the value of competition”). 
 192 41 U.S.C. § 1705 (2012). (Government agencies must employ an officer responsible for “challenging 
barriers to, and promoting full and open competition in, the procurement of property and services by the 
executive agency.”).  
 193 See generally Stucke, supra note 190, at 62–63. 
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reorganization plans predicated on a successful crowdfunding campaign can 
satisfy the low expectations of § 1129(a)(11)’s feasibility requirement.  
The fictional Al’s Pizza has served as means of simplifying this argument, 
but its inclusion serves also to keep this Comment grounded. The goal of the 
debtor, its creditors, backers, and the court should be to keep Al’s in business. 
By affording Al’s the chance to complete the crowdfunding campaign, 
bankruptcy courts can provide a low risk avenue to successfully reorganize. For 
creditors, a successful campaign represents a significant step away from 
liquidation. If there is a successful reorganization, Al’s can pay his creditors 
more than they would have received in chapter 7, return to profitability, and 
continue to provide the community with jobs. Just as well, if backers are allowed 
to receive the rewards they paid for, confidence in the crowdfunding system will 
increase. As the marketplace matures, other businesses will be able to use the 
foundation laid by Al’s to tap into the crowd for their own needs. A successful 
crowdfunding campaign is therefore an efficient solution to an otherwise costly 
problem.  
The problem of how to reorganize a crowdfunding business is new and 
uncomfortable. The goal of this Comment was to provide courts and 
practitioners with a means of understanding this problem. Ultimately, with 
regards to crowdfunding and the Code, the wheel need not, and indeed should 
not, be reinvented. Just as courts can find ways to analyze crowdfunding within 
the limits of the Code, so too can they protect and foster the competitive nature 
so inherent to crowdfunding. Debtor rehabilitation can be sought at the same 
time as the integrity of the crowdfunding system is protected. Or, to bring things 
nearly full circle, the madding crowd does not need a madding response. 
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